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This paper considers two competing pictures of knowledge of what one ought to 
do—one which assimilates this to other propositional knowledge conceived as 
partial ‘locational’ knowledge of where one is in a space of possibilities, the other 
which distinguishes this from other propositional knowledge by construing it as 
partial ‘directional’ knowledge of what to do in particular circumstances. I argue 
that the apparent tension can be lessened by better understanding the 
contextualized modal-cum-prescriptive nature of ‘ought’ and enriching our 
conception of the kinds of possibilities within which we can locate ourselves. 
I  Introduction 
We often want to acquire more knowledge about what we ought to do. For 
example, we may know that we ought generally to look out for our friends, but 
should we sign a false affidavit to protect our friends provided we’re confident it 
won’t harm anyone? Or should we, prudentially, not risk getting caught? Or 
should we, morally, never lie under oath? When asking ourselves questions like 
these, we might weigh reasons for and against various answers in the attempt to 
determine which one is correct. In doing so, we want to come to know what one 
ought to do rather than come to an answer, even the correct answer, in a 
haphazard or illogical way. 
My main question in this paper is this: When we acquire such knowledge, what is 
it like? In very rough outline, the answer I want to encourage is that this 
knowledge is a special sort of modal-cum-prescriptive knowledge; it’s knowing 
what is prescribed not just in one’s actual situation given the normative demands 
actually one actually faces but rather across a range of possible situations given a 
range of normative demands that could be in place. 
Recent discussions of moral epistemology has tended to focus on the mechanism 
or method that would lead to correct (because) warranted belief in a normative 
proposition. Do these beliefs have to be formed by a reliable process, do we have 
                                                            
1 I appreciate helpful feedback on this material from audiences at the University of 
Edinburgh, the Aristotelian Society, Graham Hubbs and Michael Ridge. 
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a special faculty of intuition for knowing such normative truths, how does 
coherence with other beliefs fit in with warrant for normative beliefs? These are 
important and difficult questions that I won’t endeavour to answer here. This is 
because I think their difficulty stems, in part, from a deeper unresolved tension 
between two programmatic pictures of what this knowledge could be like. Here I 
address this deeper tension. More precisely, I want to suggest that it can be 
lessened by making a few careful refinements of these pictures and situating 
them in their appropriate theoretical context. In my view, the key to doing so is 
recognizing the peculiar modal-cum-prescriptive character of knowledge of what 
one ought to do (which is a consequence of the peculiar modal-cum-prescriptive 
character of ‘ought’). 
II Two Pictures and Some Stage Setting 
The first picture stems from the dominant truth-conditionalist framework for 
compositional semantics. The core idea is to explain the contribution that each 
part of a sentence makes to the meaning of the whole sentences in which it 
figures by determining what it contributes to a determination of the conditions 
under which these sentences would be true. These conditions are typically 
modeled as a restriction on a set of possibilia: the possible worlds that the 
sentence correctly describes. From this, we can generate attractive explanations 
of semantic relations between sentences (such as entailment and inconsistency) 
in terms of set-theoretic relations between the worlds modelling their contents. 
Moreover, an intuitive picture of propositional knowledge falls out: knowing that 
S is knowing whether the actual world is in the set of possible worlds correctly 
described by S. Propositional knowledge is a kind of descriptive-locational 
knowledge. It’s like knowing which maps in an indefinite library of maps 
correctly represent the relevant part of reality. 
It’s important to recognize in this context that ought-sentences embed in similar 
ways to other declarative sentences (for example under sentential connectives, 
propositional attitude verbs, epistemic modals, etc.). Hence, if we are attracted to 
the semantic explanations of these (and other) phenomena offered by this 
framework, it seems that we should apply it to ought-sentences as well. 
(Otherwise we’ll be committed to ad hoc explanations of the semantic operation 
of sentential connectives, propositional attitude verbs, epistemic modals, etc. 
when they embed ‘ought’s). But, if we do that, shouldn’t we extend the 
descriptive-locational picture of knowledge to this case as well? Knowing that 
one ought to ϕ would then be construed as something like knowing that the 
actual world is amongst the worlds correctly described by the sentence ‘One 
ought to ϕ’. 
But some philosophers will demur: Isn’t normative knowledge fundamentally 
different from factual knowledge? Didn’t Hume teach us to distinguish thoughts 
about what is the case from thoughts about what someone ought to do; and 
didn’t Kant teach us that the mode of understanding involved in knowing a 
theoretical fact about empirical reality is fundamentally different from that 
involved in knowing a practical fact about what one ought to do? 
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The intuition of difference evinced in these questions often seems to be about 
what metaethicists would now call ‘all-things-considered normativity’. Roughly, 
the idea is that knowledge of what one ought all-things-considered to do is 
fundamentally different from factual knowledge of conditions of the world; the 
former may often be based on the latter, but because of the practical reasons-
giving character of normative2 knowledge, it cannot be knowledge of reality. That 
may be true, but the second programmatic picture considered here stems from a 
more basic intuition: Statements about what one ought to do3—even many of 
which aren’t intended as or taken to be ‘all-things-considered normative’ are 
prescriptive rather than descriptive; they’re for telling people what to do rather 
than what reality is like. This suggests that knowing that one ought to ϕ is 
practical-directional rather than descriptive-locational. It’s like having someone 
draw starting and ending points on the map, telling one where to go from where 
one is. 
To fix ideas, let’s call these the ‘locational’ and ‘directional’ pictures of ought-
knowledge stemming, respectively, from the (semantic) ‘Framework’ and the 
‘Intuition’ (of a difference between description and prescription). The traditional 
cognitivist positions in metaethics cohere best with the locational picture and 
find support in the popularity of the Framework amongst philosophers of 
language. The traditional noncognitivist positions in metaethics are often 
motivated by the Intuition, and, insofar as the countenance normative 
knowledge at all, they seek it in something like the directional picture. That is to 
say that this traditional debate encourages us to choose which of the two pictures 
of ought-knowledge we find more compelling (in light of inter alia varying 
strengths of background commitments to the Framework and the Intuition). But 
ideally we wouldn’t have to choose. The Framework is very powerful and the 
picture of knowledge that p as locating ourselves amongst possibilities where p 
holds is attractive, but the intuition that ‘ought-to-do’s are prescriptive rather 
than descriptive is very strong and the picture of ought-knowledge as providing 
at least prima facie practical direction is also attractive. Isn’t there a way for some 
locational knowledge to be directional—for the Framework to be squared with 
the Intuition? 
                                                            
2What about other kinds of ‘normative’ knowledge, such as knowing what’s best or when 
there are reasons or what is wrong? I think it’s reasonable to think such knowledge is 
‘fraught with ought’ at least in the weak sense that it is often partially prescriptive rather 
than entirely descriptive. So, it should be integrable into the picture I develop; however, I 
shall not argue for this point here and am happy to restrict my focus for the purposes of 
this paper to ought-knowledge. 
3This is not meant to discount the possibility that some ought-statements are merely 
about what ought to be the case instead of about what someone ought to do. Plausible 
candidates includes so-called evaluative (or bouletic) ‘ought’s such as ‘There ought to be 
no childhood death and disease’ and predictive (or epistemic) ‘ought’s such as ‘The storm 
ought to hit before midnight.’ The semantics for ‘ought’ sketched below is intended to 
handle both species of ‘ought’ without positing ambiguity (see Chrisman (2012a) for 
arguments against ought-to-do/ought-to-be ambiguity) while making sense of the 
prescriptive character of ‘ought-to-do’s. 
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In what follows, I want to take three steps towards a positive answer to this 
question and, hopefully, a better picture of knowledge of what one ought to do. 
First, I will discuss the contextualist view that ‘ought’ is semantically sensitive to 
the context in which it is used. Although it has sometimes been obscured in 
metaethics, this is surely right.4 The interesting issue here will be how much that 
helps with harmonizing the two pictures of ought-knowledge. Although the 
account of the meaning of ‘ought’ I favour is resolutely contextualist, I’ll argue 
that contextualism alone doesn’t do enough. Second, I will discuss the norm-
relativist view that normative sentences are semantically special in that they 
should be assigned semantic values not at various possible worlds but rather 
relative to various possible norms. I think this isn’t quite right, but I’ll suggest 
that it helps us to break the connection between location and description: 
location amongst possible worlds and possible norms might provide direction 
rather than mere description. Finally, I will argue for a kind of synthesis of these 
two ideas, suggesting that ought-sentences sometimes embed prescriptions 
(rather than propositions) and function semantically to evaluate the correctness 
of these relative to a range of possible norms (and worlds). The resulting view is 
one according to which ‘ought’ is a special kind of necessity modal, sometimes 
saying what prescriptions are correct across a range of possible norms and 
worlds. Knowing what one ought to do (morally, prudentially, …) is thereby 
portrayed as locating oneself in a space of possible world-norm pairs, partially 
understanding what reality is like and what the relevant norms prescribe in those 
circumstances.5 
III  Semantic Contextualism 
The received view in linguistic semantics is that ‘ought’ is a modal verb, and like 
other modal verbs it’s meaning is sensitive to context of use in several distinctive 
ways. One can get a rough and ready appreciation of the motivation for this view 
by just considering all of the things that a statement made with the sentence 
‘Jerry ought to win his race’ could mean given varying contexts of use: (moral) 
that he is morally obliged to keep his promise to do so, (prudential) that his life 
would go best by winning, (teleological) that it would promote his political career 
to stand in an election he’s sure to win, (epistemic) that it would now be highly 
unexpected if his boat didn’t drift across the finish line before the competitors, 
(bouletic/evaluative) that it’d be generally best if he happened to win this time… 
                                                            
4I argue for this in more detail in Chrisman (2012b), and I critically evaluate several 
proposals for reducing the meaning of ‘ought’ to other normative or evaluative terms 
(such as ‘reason’ or ‘what’s best’) in Chrisman (2015 ch. 2). 
5This is not, I should note, to promise a reductive account of what it is for norms to 
prescribe or any sort of explanation of why some prescriptions have all-things-
considered normative force for us. I think it is incumbent on a semantics for ‘ought’ to 
explain its canonical use in prescribing rather than describing, but semantics is not the 
place to proffer accounts of the sources of normativity any more than it is the place to 
proffer explanations of the sources of necessity. At the very end of the paper, I’ll briefly 
mention some ways I see the semantics for ‘ought’ sketched here as fitting with broader 
issues in metanormative theory. 
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Clearly this abstract sentence-type must interact with the context in which it is 
used in order to determine a specific meaning, such as one of these. 
This is relevant here for two reasons. First, it suggests that not all ought-claims 
are prescriptive. For not all of the possible meanings of an ought-sentence bear 
on what one is to do (for instance, the ‘epistemic’ and ‘bouletic’ readings of the 
sentence above don’t seem to have anything special to do with what Jerry is to 
do.) Second, the fact that ‘ought’ is a context-sensitive modal means that 
applying the truth conditionalist semantic framework outlined above to ought-
sentences is more complicated than applying it to ordinary subject-predicate 
sentences. So, perhaps there is room in this complication for alleviating some of 
the tension between our two pictures of normative knowledge. 
The standard way to extend the Framework to ought-sentences is to treat ‘ought’ 
as a necessity-like modal operator, taking an embedded ‘prejacent’ proposition 
and evaluating whether it holds true across a contextually determined set of 
possible worlds, where the contextually determined ‘flavour’ (moral, prudential, 
teleological, epistemic, bouletic, etc.) of this ‘ought’ partially determines the set of 
worlds. The basic idea is to say that sentences of the form ‘ought[p]’ are true just 
in case p is true at all of the relevantly accessible possible worlds. And what 
counts as ‘relevantly accessible’ is fixed by context of use in a complex way 
usually depending on what background conditions and standards are assumed.6 
Moreover, context is also thought to be relevant for recovering the precise value 
of p from the surface sentence. 
Given this, if we follow standard practice and model p as the set of possible 
worlds where p is true, we can extend the Framework to model the truth 
condition of a sentence of the form ‘ought[p]’ as the set of possible, worlds 
relative to which all relevantly accessible worlds are worlds where p is true. 
Although this surely needs refinement as a thesis of natural language semantics7, 
it seems to be a pretty good starting point for explaining the diversity of things 
an ought-sentence can mean, and it more or less retains the Framework’s 
prospects for displaying the compositional structure of a language and explaining 
semantic relations such as entailment and inconsistency in terms of set-theoretic 
relations. 
How might that help with the tension we observed at the beginning? One 
suggestion worth considering is that, because ‘ought’ is context sensitive in the 
way it selects a set of possible worlds where it evaluates the prejacent proposition, 
perhaps context can mark out some ‘ought’s as special in being prescriptive for 
the agent in question. For example, perhaps one of the things that ‘Jerry ought to 
win his race’ could mean is that, in all possible worlds where the relevant moral 
demands, prudential advice, … are followed, the following proposition is true: 
Jerry’s counterpart wins his race. If that’s right, then although there are other 
                                                            
6Cf. Kratzer (1981). 
7For example, it doesn’t respect the apparent weakness of ‘ought’ compared to ‘must’, and 
it faces a number of tricky problems having to do with evidence-sensitivity, embedding 
in conditionals, and dilemmas. There is a vast literature on these topics; some of the most 
recent contributions are in Charlow and Chrisman (forthcoming). 
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things this sentence could mean in different contexts, in some contexts, ‘ought’ 
has a distinctively prescriptive meaning. That may be the case even while we 
continue to use the Framework for articulating the meaning of this and all other 
ought-sentences. 
Does that resolve the tension between the locational and directional pictures of 
ought-knowledge? I think the contextualist suggestion represents a step in the 
right direction, but I still worry that it doesn’t properly respect the Intuition that 
ought-knowledge can be distinctively directional in a way that ordinary 
descriptive knowledge is not. 
For, the simple contextualism above suggests that, once context has fixed the 
flavour of an ‘ought’, the sentence in which it is used does specify a condition of 
reality under which it would be true, albeit a modal condition—roughly, being 
such that the prejacent proposition is true at all of the worlds that are ‘accessible’ 
in the contextually relevant way. Knowing what one ought to do is still a matter 
of understanding something about where the actual world is in a space of 
possible worlds, albeit in a somewhat more complex way that involves knowing 
which further worlds are ‘accessible’ from the actual world. And sometimes what 
makes a world ‘accessible’ is whether the relevant normative demands in the 
actual world are satisfied by one’s counterpart in that possible world. 
But there’s something odd about this idea. The Intuition of difference described 
above implies that knowledge that I ought to ϕ can provide direction, telling me, 
that ϕ-ing is the thing for me to do, at least in some respect, which seems 
different from knowing that, in all possible worlds where the relevant norms 
aren’t violated, it is true that my counterpart ϕs. Why would the shenanigans of 
my counterpart in other possible worlds be relevant to my practical deliberations 
about what to do in the actual world?8 In terms of the previous metaphor of 
maps, on this contextualist view, it is as if some of the maps that correctly 
represent a corner of reality also have flags on them indicating that a goal is 
accessible (that is some possible person like me gets there). But these flags do not 
by themselves capture the way in which ought-knowledge can actually direct my 
action.9 
IV  Norm Relativism 
Let’s turn the crank a bit further. Rather than using a semantic model that treats 
declarative sentences (in context) as having truth values relative to possible 
worlds, some philosophers of language think we should use an enriched version 
of the possible worlds model which evaluates declaratives relative to other kinds 
of parameters. There are a variety of ways this might go, but the core idea is to 
                                                            
8Kripke (1980, 45). 
9Compare Korsgaard (2008: 315): “If to have knowledge is to have a map of the world, 
then … the ability to act [well] cannot be given … by having little normative flags added 
to the map of nature that mark out certain spots or certain routes as good.  You still have 
to know how to use the map before the little normative flags can be any good to you.)” 
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say instead that declarative sentences hold (or don’t) at things like world-
evidence pairs (to handle probabilistic sentences), world-time pairs (to handle 
future contingent sentences), at world-standards pairs (to handle sentences of 
personal taste), or world-individual pairs (to handle distinctively de se and de te 
sentences).10 
An extension of this idea is available for normative sentences.11 Suppressing any 
other semantic relativity, we might say that sentences hold (or don’t) relative to 
world-norm pairs, depending on what propositions are true at the world 
parameter and what possible states of affairs are ‘correct’ relative to the norm 
parameter (where often these two things interact). The content of any declarative 
sentence S can then be modeled as a set of world-norm pairs: the set of pairs of 
possible worlds and possible norms relative to which S holds. When it comes to 
purely descriptive sentences, the norm-relativist’s idea is to think of them as 
norm-invariant, such that they hold at a world-norm pair just in case they are 
true relative to the world parameter. Then traditional truth conditions, modeled 
as a set of possible worlds, are predicted as a special case of the more general 
enriched semantic model. This allows the norm-relativist to say, in contrast, that 
purely normative sentences are world-invariant, such that they hold at a world-
norm pair just in case what they demand is correct relative to the norm 
parameter. (Out of this falls an explanation of why high-level normative 
propositions often seem to be necessary: whether they hold doesn’t depend on 
any factual conditions.) In this enriched framework, all other declarative 
sentences will be treated as mixed. This means that they hold depending on both 
the way things are factually and the way things are normatively. 
That’s rather abstract. So let’s consider an example: S= ‘Sally ought to devote her 
life to philosophy,’ and let’s assume context renders this ‘ought’ prescriptive (in 
whatever sense is relevant to the tension between the locational and directional 
pictures of ought-knowledge above) rather than bouletic, epistemic, etc. On the 
norm-relativist view, S holds at a world-norm pair <w,n> just in case the factual 
conditions of w are such that the state of affairs where Sally devotes her life to 
philosophy is correct relative to n. That means the content of S can be modeled 
as the set of all such world-norm pairs. This is supposed to be a relatively 
conservative extension to the way we previously modeled the content of a 
sentence S as the set of worlds where S is true. However, now we use a broader 
notion of ‘holding’ relative to more complex parameters. This allows for truth-
relative-to-world and correctness-relative-to-norm as special cases.12 
                                                            
10Often this is developed as a form of ‘truth-relativism’ in that these enriched notions of 
‘holding’ are still treated as ‘holding true’. Cf. MacFarlane (2014) amongst others. The 
relationship between the theoretical notion of holding true at a series of parameters 
deployed in a semantic model and truth is not at all clear, and nothing in the norm-
relativist idea I go onto describe requires thinking of the view as a view about truth. For 
example in Gibbard (1990) something like this idea was used for normative sentences but 
it was also denied that normative sentences have truth values. 
11Cf. Gibbard (1990, ch. 5), Silk (2013), MacFarlane (2014, ch. 11). 
12It’s worth noting that this approach is neutral on ‘relativism’ in the traditional 
metaethical sense, that is whether there is one (perhaps complex) universally correct 
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I think the relativist idea is intriguing. Semantically, it’s more or less isomorphic 
to the standard possible worlds model for truth-conditional semantics, so it 
promises similar resources for explaining semantic relations between sentences 
and amongst their parts in set-theoretic terms, but it also provides a way to 
respect the Intuition that ought-sentences are not descriptive (even of complex 
modal conditions of reality).13 For, on this view, these sentences don’t have 
traditional truth-conditions; whether they hold at a world-norm pair depends on 
the norms rather than (only) how things are descriptively. 
Nevertheless, I think we shouldn’t be completely satisfied with norm-relativism. 
For one thing, although there are answers to this question worth exploring, It 
remains highly unclear what it means on this view when a normative sentence is 
embedded under a propositional attitude verb or epistemic modal. For instance, 
if someone says ‘It might be true that we ought sign a false affidavit to protect our 
friends,’ the norm-relativist cannot treat ‘might’ as it is typically treated in terms 
of a proposition being true at some possible worlds in the set of accessible 
worlds. The obvious alternative is to treat ‘might’ in terms of a proposition 
‘holding’ at some world-norm in the set of accessible world-norm pairs. But how 
do we determine which are the accessible world-norm pairs when the sentence is 
embedded under ‘might’? 
More importantly, I suspect relativism still obscures the way ought-knowledge 
can be directional. For it seems to make understanding ought-sentences into 
something like understanding what possible states of affairs count as correct 
relative to some norms, rather than understanding what the sentence tells the 
relevant agent to do in various possible conditions. It’s as if some of the maps 
have regions coloured red and green, not to represent a factual condition of 
reality but to mark out which parts of reality accord with the relevant norms and 
which don’t. While telling someone what to do is related to dividing states of 
affairs into correct/incorrect, it’s not obvious these are equivalent. 
V Reapplication and Extension 
In this section I want to reapply the core idea of norm-relativism and extend the 
core idea of semantic contextualism. I think this provides for an attractive 
synthesis of these ideas and a better way to resolve the tension between the two 
programmatic pictures of ought-knowledge from the beginning. 
As I have already mentioned, declarative ought-sentences have all of the 
linguistic hallmarks of being truth-apt in exactly the same way as any other 
                                                                                                                                                   
normative standard. Whether a normative sentence holds relative to a world-norm pair is 
parallel to the way we previously treated sentences as true relative to a world. That does 
not imply that there are multiple incompatible norms in play in any given context any 
more than the standard possible worlds model implies that there are multiple 
incompatible worlds considered actual in any given context. 
13As Dreier (2009) shows, there are formally isomorphic ‘genuinely’ relativist and 
expressivist implementations of this semantics, and the difference between them comes 
in what they say about indirect contexts and disagreement. 
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declarative sentences, which makes it prima facie odd to assign them complex 
holding-values at world-norm pairs rather than ordinary truth-values at worlds. 
In contrast, however, imperatives don’t have all of the linguistic hallmarks of 
being truth-apt. Indeed it’s highly weird to think about imperatives as true or 
false at possible worlds; and they don’t embed under propositional attitude verbs 
or epistemic modals. Nonetheless, imperatives do seem to stand in semantic 
relations (something) like entailment and inconsistency, and they seem to be 
semantically composed out of more basic parts. Moreover, imperatives can 
combine with declaratives under some sentential connectives to form logically 
complex mixed sentences.14 So, any full semantic theory will need a way to model 
the contents of imperatives and the semantic relations in which they stand.15 
Developing and defending such a view will be a highly complex affair, but one 
way we might begin the story is by applying something like the norm-relativist 
approach sketched above to imperatives in the first instance rather than 
normative declaratives. As we standardly think of declaratives (or their contents: 
propositions) as true (or not) relative to possible worlds, we might think of 
imperatives (or their contents: prescriptions?) as correct (or not) relative to 
possible norms.16 More precisely, since the status of an imperative often depends 
on the factual conditions of the situation to which it is supposed to apply, we find 
some traction for a semantics and logic of imperatives in a semantic model that 
assigns imperatives (in context) correctness values relative to world-norm pairs. 
Then we could try to explain semantic relations such as entailment and 
inconsistency as they hold between imperatives in terms of set-theoretic relations 
amongst sets of world-norm pairs. At base, this is just the norm-relativist idea 
reapplied to imperatives. 
Generalizing, the idea would be to enhance the semantic Framework with which 
we began so that the semantic content of a declarative or an imperative sentence 
S determines a set of world-norm pairs relative to which S holds. But now we 
                                                            
14This is part of the difficulty a satisfaction-condition semantics for imperatives; it’s 
unclear what results when satisfaction conditions are combined with truth conditions 
under a sentential connective such as disjunction. 
15See Charlow (2014) for an excellent discussion of this in the context of compositional 
semantics. For further conceptual arguments against accounts of the meaning of 
imperatives that give them propositional contents or meanings derivative of 
propositional contents, see Chrisman and Hubbs (unpublished). 
16What is a norm and how does it determine the correctness of a prescription? There are 
several ways we might answer this question, many of which are going to be formally 
adequate for the purposes of compositional semantics. What distinguishes them is how 
much they illuminate linguistic competence and fit with one’s ancillary metanormative 
commitments. (More on this towards the end of the paper.) But a simple answer we can 
start with is that norms are higher-level prescriptions that entail lower-level prescriptions 
given in various factual circumstances. (Note that this question is exactly parallel to the 
question of what are worlds and how do they determine the truth of a proposition. Again 
there are several ways we might answer this question, many of which are going to be 
formally adequate for the purposes of compositional semantics but distinguishable in 
light of how they illuminate linguistic competence and fit with other philosophical 
commitments.) 
 10 
recognize two species of ‘holding’ depending on whether the sentence is 
declarative or imperative. In case it is declarative, it holds relative to a world-
norm pair iff the proposition it expresses is contained (i.e., true at) in the world 
parameter. In case it is imperative, it holds relative to a world-norm pair iff the 
prescription it expresses is contained (i.e., correct relative to) in the norm 
parameter (given whatever is true at the world parameter). The upshot is an 
enhanced semantic model where the holding-conditions of declarative and 
imperative (and mixed) sentences can be modelled as a set of world-norm pairs: 
the set of pairs of possible worlds and possible norms where the sentence holds. 
So far that has nothing specifically to do with the semantics of ‘ought’, but it will 
do if we refine the contextualist view about ‘ought’ sketched above in the right 
way. Above I mentioned that, on the standard contextualist view about modals, 
context is relevant for recovering the precise prejacent proposition from the 
surface sentence. The prejacent proposition is the embedded content a modal 
like ‘ought’ is standardly thought to operate on, evaluating whether it is true 
across a the range of ‘accessible’ worlds. The suggestion I now want to make is 
that we extend this idea and allow that ‘ought’ can operate on a more complex 
range of prejacents—both propositions and prescriptions. 
When ‘ought’ operates on a prescriptive prejacent, (as a first pass) we’ll say that it 
evaluates whether this prescription is correct across a range of ‘accessible’ world-
norm pairs. This is like we previously said (also as a first pass) that, as a necessity 
modal, ‘ought’ evaluates whether its propositional prejacent is true across a range 
of ‘accessible’ worlds. Indeed, the new model continues to predict the old result 
as a special case. My idea is that sometimes we should continue to understand 
‘ought’ as operating on propositional prejacents (this is how it will work for 
epistemic and bouletic ‘ought’s); it’s just that I now want to allow that there are 
other times where we should understand ‘ought’ as operating on prescriptive 
prejacents. The surface sentence alone won’t determine which it is; for this we 
also need context of use. Prescriptive ‘ought’s are ones which context determines 
to embed a prescription as their prejacent. This is the sense in which this is an 
refinement of the standard contextualist view about the semantics of ‘ought’. 
As a semantics for ‘ought’, the preceding is still rough in several important 
respects, but I hope the basic idea is clear enough: we interpret ‘ought’ as a 
special sort of necessity modal, one which doesn’t just have the function of 
evaluating the truth of prejacent propositions at a set of possible worlds but 
which also has the function of evaluating the correctness of prescriptions at a set 
of possible norms (given what is true at possible worlds). This is what I had in 
mind above when I said that we need to recognize the peculiar modal-cum-
prescriptive character of ‘ought’. 
I suggested that recognizing this would help to alleviate the tension between the 
locational and directional pictures of ought-knowledge stemming from the 
Framework and the Intuition. Here’s how: On this view, understanding an 
ought-claim can be thought of as having an ability to correctly divide a space of 
possibilities into those relative to which its prejacent holds and those relative to 
which it doesn’t. However, since we have enhanced our conception of prejacents 
and correlatively what it is for them to ‘hold’ relative to some possibility, we can 
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now recognize two special cases depending on whether the prejacent is a 
proposition or a prescription.17 That means that, although we’ll continue to think 
of knowledge of what one ought to do as a sort of modal knowledge, it will not be 
construed as the ability to locate (only) the actual world in a space of possible 
worlds. We can still use the idea of locational knowledge, but now this 
knowledge involves locating agents in a space of possible world-norm pairs. 
Knowing that one ought to ϕ is knowing what one is to do across a range of 
possible worlds given a range of possible norms that apply.18 
The key idea here is that by allowing prescriptions into the analysis of ought-
claims, we generate resources for capturing the distinctive directional aspect of a 
particular species of modal locational knowledge. It’s like having a temporally 
extended map with a dynamic navigational system capable of calculating where 
you are and telling you what to do to get where you’re supposed, in some respect, 
to be. 
VI Conclusion 
Modelling the contents of declarative sentences as sets of possible worlds does a 
lot of important work in compositional semantics, and it encourages us to 
conceive of propositional knowledge as partial knowledge of where the actual 
world is in a space of possible worlds. However, there seems to be a very 
important distinction between knowledge of describable conditions of reality, 
which is like having an accurate map, and knowledge of what one ought to do, 
                                                            
17I discuss the challenge of capturing the distinction between ought-to-do and ought-to-
be senses of ‘ought’ in much more detail in Chrisman (2012a) and Chrisman (2015 ch. 5). 
There are several interesting alternative proposals worth considering, including the 
possibility of stit-propositions and even that ‘ought’ is syntactically ambiguous. Here I 
am simply gesturing at my preferred way through this debate, in order to show how it 
can be deployed in a refined picture of ought-knowledge. 
18 In fn. 16, I suggested there are many ways to develop the idea of a prescription’s being 
correct relative to a norm that are compatible with using this idea in our semantics for 
‘ought’. One might conceive of norms as high-level general prescriptions, such as we 
might express with ‘Maximise happiness!’ or ‘Act for genuine reasons!’; but one might 
instead conceive of them as high-level general ought-propositions of the right flavour, 
such as we might express with ‘One ought always to maximize happiness’ or ‘One ought 
always act for genuine reasons.’ Here, for the purpose of urging the integration of the 
locational and directional pictures of ought-knowledge, I have wanted to remain as 
neutral as possible about this issue (though I have been working mostly tacitly with the 
former conception). However, we should recognise that, even if both of these 
conceptions are usable the purposes of semantics, neither is an ideal place for 
metanormative theory to terminate. For they immediately invite the questions: what 
makes it the case that a high-level general norm ‘holds’; and how do we know which of 
these norms ‘hold’? Treating norms as high-level prescriptions threatens to trivialise the 
holding of the highest-level norms (for almost any prescription will hold relative to 
itself); but treating norms as high-level ought-propositions threatens to render the 
treatment of ‘ought’ suggested here uninformatively circular. In the following section, I 
say a bit more about the issue while remaining unsatisfied with my ability to answer these 
questions. (Thanks here to Kathryn Lindeman and Adrian Moore for helpful discussion.) 
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which is like having directions for how to navigate within the space that is 
mapped. I have argued that this tension can be alleviated by enhancing the 
possible worlds framework in a way that is independently motivated by the need 
to account for the semantics of imperatives. If we do this, then I think we can 
embed the results in a more sophisticated contextualist semantics for ‘ought’—
one that allows us to make sense of the idea that some locational knowledge is 
directional by recognizing our ability to locate ourselves amongst a space of 
possible norms and know which prescriptions they legitimate (given our factual 
circumstances). 
I want to close by responding to two related questions so far left open by my 
discussion. I doubt my responses are adequate, but I hope they give some sense 
of how I am thinking about the theoretical landscape at the intersection of 
semantic theory, normative theory, and metanormative theory. 
First Question: Given that there are indefinite many possible norms, what 
determines which norms are such that the prescriptions they render ‘correct’ 
have reason-giving or ‘normative’ force for particular agents in particular 
circumstances? 
Second Question: If, in the end, there is a formula determining the truth 
conditions of ought-sentences, doesn’t that mean that statements deploying these 
sentences are descriptive after all? 
My answer to the first question is mainly negative: Nothing about the meaning of 
‘ought’ can tell us what one ought all-things-considered to do. A general 
contextualist semantics for ‘ought’ might help us to understand how context of 
use determines some ought-statements to be distinctively relevant to practical 
deliberation (or even to be practically deliberative in a distinctively all-things-
considered way). And my particular version of the contextualist semantics might 
help us to understand that such deliberative contexts make the prescriptive 
character of various norms most salient. However, determining which norms are 
‘normative’ for various agents requires first-order normative reflection about 
what kinds of considerations do and don’t have reason-giving force. 
By contrast, I think the second question encourages further positive reflection on 
what we’re up to when we seek to assign truth conditions to declarative sentences 
as part of the project of compositional semantics. In my view, this is a 
metasemantic question rather than a question in first-order semantics. It’s not a 
question about what the correct semantics is, for example, for ‘ought’ but rather 
about what it is in virtue of which a semantics like the one I sketched above 
might be (approximately) correct. In making a specific semantic proposal, what 
kind of nonsemantic facts is one trying to identify, characterize, or model that 
would ground the semantic facts we observe (for example about entailment, 
inconsistency, and composition)?19 
                                                            
19Perez Carballo (2014) usefully distinguishes a ‘hermeneutic’ question about how to 
interpret the formal specifications of truth conditions in truth conditional semantics 
from an ‘explanatory’ question about what it is that explains the (approximate) 
correctness of the formal specifications of truth conditions for a sentence. By using 
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Taking recent metaethics as a guide, I think we can discern two very 
programmatic answers to this question to which I would like to add a third for 
consideration. 
First, we can follow a descriptivist route and, as the question suggests, understand 
the truth conditions assigned to declarative sentences by our best compositional 
semantics as an attempt to spell out how that sentence describes reality as being. 
This means that one plausible way to interpret the account above is as a 
determination of how ought-sentences describe reality as being. How they 
describe reality being depends on which ‘flavor’ of ‘ought’ is relevant in the 
context, which in turn determines (assuming the semantics above) which set of 
possible world-norm pairs count as accessible. But, in the end of the day, the idea 
would be that ought-claims describe reality as being such that the embedded 
prejacent holds at a variety of world-norm pairs. On a realist manifestation of 
this view, possible worlds and possible norms are parts of reality, ought-claims 
are attempting to describe them, and our semantics for these sentences is part of 
an attempt to spell out what in reality would make these claims true. The 
direction provided by distinctively prescriptive ‘ought’s would need to somehow 
derive from the complex modal pieces of reality described by those sentences. 
Second, we might follow an ideationalist route and argue that truth-conditional 
semantics is an attempt to spell out what one ought, by virtue of the core 
communicative rules of the language, to think when one uses a sentence to make 
an assertion.20 This is one way to make sense of the idea that various sentences 
are canonical vehicles for expressing thoughts with particular contents. For 
example, we might say (assuming the semantics above) that one who asserts “Bill 
ought to kiss Lucy” has expressed the thought (ought to think that) the 
prescription Bill, kiss Lucy is correct across the contextually relevant possibilities 
(worlds and norms). In general, this is an alternative way to understand why 
sentences have the truth conditions our best semantic theory says that they have. 
And it makes room for a non-standard form of expressivism21 because, although 
it assigns truth conditions to ought-sentences, it leaves open whether the 
thoughts they express are descriptive thoughts about how reality is or conative 
                                                                                                                                                   
language of ‘in virtue of’ here, I mean to indicate that we’re not looking for mere 
interpretations of formal machinery (though that may come with particular 
metasemantic theories), rather we’re looking for very general grounding explanations that 
seek to identify the kinds of nonsemantic facts that undergird the semantic facts 
postulated by empirical semantics (as opposed, for example to causal or genealogical 
explanations or mere supervenience bases). Compare Yalcin (2014, 18). Some (for 
example Speaks (2010)) may prefer the term ‘foundational theory of meaning’ or ‘theory 
of the foundations of meaning’ for what I am calling metasemantics. 
20Precursors and versions of this idea can be found in Grice (1989), Blackburn (1984), 
Davis (2003). 
21It’s non-standard because it conceives of expressivism as a thesis in metasemantics 
rather than compositional semantics. As such it doesn’t face the sorts of objections to 
expressivism’s adequacy as a semantic thesis pressed by inter alia Rosen (1998) and 
Schroeder (2008). Expressivism as a metasemantic thesis is suggested by Suikkanen 
(2009) and Chrisman (2012a); a particular ‘hybrid’ version is worked out and defended 
by Ridge (2014). 
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thoughts capable of motivating action. Expressivist might then argue on 
independent grounds having to do with the psychology of motivation and the 
motivational character of normative thinking that it is the latter (at least in cases 
where the ‘ought’ is moral or all-things-considered). 
Finally, we could start instead with the inferentialist idea that a specification of 
the truth conditions of a sentence is an initial spelling out of what one who 
asserts the sentence is committed to as a premise with further downstream 
inferential consequences, and what one would have to entitle oneself to by 
looking to upstream inferential antecedents were one to be legitimately 
challenged.22 In this way, we might see an assignment of truth conditions to a 
sentence as an articulation of the position in a network of implications occupied 
by one who uses the sentence to make an assertion in ordinary discursive 
practice. Then, if I may cryptically register an idea I try to make better sense of 
elsewhere23, the metaethically and ontologically interesting distinction wouldn’t 
be between descriptions of reality and expressions of conative thoughts 
motivating action but rather between descriptions of reality and endorsements of 
inference rules characterizing the logical structure of the concepts we use to 
think both about the actual world and what to do in it. If we go on to treat modal 
claims as a species of broadly logical claims then we could hold that, although 
they can be thought of as characterizing a set of possibilia that are ‘accessible’ 
from the actual world, that characterization is not an ontologically committing 
description of modal space, nor an expression of a conative attitude, but rather an 
inferentially committing endorsement of the logic of particular concepts. The 
rough idea is that, as modal claims, ‘ought’s sometimes function to endorse 
inferential relations to prescriptions implicitly wrapped up in some of our other 
concepts. When we think that knowledge that one ought to ϕ in circumstances C 
settles the question of whether to ϕ in C, that ought-knowledge is all-things-
considered normative for the agent. 
For my part, I suspect that the notions of describing reality, expressing our minds, 
and committing to inferences are all crucial to developing a full theory of 
meaningfulness. But because I think the latter notion is most fundamental in the 
order of explanation, I favor the third metasemantic account of what it is in 
virtue of which ought-sentences have the truth conditions that they do. And this 
is why I think assigning truth conditions to them, as I suggested we do above, 
doesn’t by itself commit me to descriptivism (or expressivism) about them. 
 
                                                            
22This is inspired by Sellars (1953; 1974) and Brandom (1994, 2008), but their views on 
truth-conditional semantics are less than clear (often they seem to reject it, though it is 
not clear what they propose as an alternative approach to compositional semantics, as 
opposed to metasemantics). 
23In my 2015, ch. 5, and 2016, I explain how modal operators can, on the inferentialist 
view, be treated as second-order (or ‘metaconceptual’) devices for making explicit and 
endorsing the logico-semantic relations between first-order terms and concepts. 
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